










independence	 from	 the	 British	 Empire.	 The	 paper	 looks	 at	 the	 negotiations	
concerning	 the	 financial	 settlement	prior	 to	 independence.	Britain	sought	 to	keep	
Malaya	within	 the	Sterling	Area	at	all	 costs,	 even	after	de	 jure	 convertibility	had	
been	achieved,	due	to	 its	high	dollar	earning	capacity,	which	remained	 important	
due	to	persistent	trade	deficits	with	the	US	since	the	end	of	the	Second	World	War.	









Malayan	 independence	 would	 take.	 These	 talks	 were	 followed	 by	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 special	
commission,	 which	 toured	 Malaya	 until	 late-1956,	 publishing	 a	 report,	 the	 Reid	 Report,	 on	






synthetic	 rubber	 from	 the	 dollar	 area.	 The	 second	 section	 focuses	 specifically	 on	 the	
Constitutional	 Talks,	 which	were	 dominated	 by	 the	 issue	 of	 dollar	 spending.	 The	 paper’s	 third	
section	deals	with	 the	 late-1956	Financial	Discussions	and	 the	 issue	of	development	aid	 for	 the	




of	 British	 international	 economic	 policy.	While	Malaya	 begins	 to	 act	more	 independently,	 and	
indeed	 receives	 formal	 independence,	 from	 Britain,	 Malaya	 simply	 acts	 more	 independently	









The	 relationship	 between	 Britain	 and	 Malaya,	 both	 before	 and	 after	 independence,	 offers	 an	
insight	 into	 the	 nature	 of	 imperialism.	Rather	 than	 seeing	 this	 relationship	 as	 simple	 one-way	
domination,	 as	 classical	 and	 dependency	 theories	 of	 imperialism	 have	 argued,	 this	 episode	
reveals	the	collaboration	between	and	shared	goals	of	both	British	and	Malayan	state	managers.3	
This	 is	 not	 to	 suggest	 that	 imperialism	 is	 a	meeting	 of	 equals,	 or	 a	 conspiracy	 between	 state	






broader	 accounts	 of	 British	 imperial	 relations,	 including	 those	 of	 Krozewski	 and	 Hinds,	 whose	
accounts	 of	 colonial	 independence,	 such	 as	 Malaya’s,	 rest	 on	 a	 curious	 mix	 of	 continuity	 and	
discontinuity	 based	 upon	 the	 formal	 end	 of	 empire	 and	 the	 existence	 of	 sympathetic	 elites	 in	
post-colonial	 states.4	Their	 accounts,	 however,	 focus	 on	 the	 broader	 trend	 of	 decolonization	
rather	 than	 specific	 cases.	More	 specific	 scholarly	 attention	 derives	 from	 the	 work	 of	 Schenk,	
Strange,	White	and	Harper.5	Their	more	focused	analyses	offer	stronger	evidence	for	continuity,	
particularly	 in	 the	 case	 of	White,	who	offers	 substantial	 archival	 evidence	 to	 support	 claims	 of	
continuity.6	
	 However,	 lacking	 in	 their	 accounts	 is	 an	 attempt	 to	 situate	 Malayan	 independence	 in	
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terms	of	 the	broader	political	 economic	 environment	Britain	 faced	 in	 the	 1950s.	White	 focuses	
more	on	Malayan-Asian	trade	patterns,	while	Harper	focuses	on	the	making	of	the	post-colonial	
Malayan	state	–	a	similar	focus	as	Amin	and	Stockwell,	albeit	in	less	radical	terms.7	Indeed,	Harper	
notes	 that	 his	 goal	 was	 to	 understand	 decolonization	 “as	 seen	 from	 Malaya	 and	 not	 from	
London”.8	The	goal	of	this	paper	is	the	exact	opposite	to	Harper’s	work	and	seeks	to	understand	
how	British	state	managers	sought	to	retain	Malaya	within	the	Sterling	Area.	Also	lacking	in	their	
accounts	 is	 a	 critical	 analysis	 of	 why	 it	 remains	 in	 Malaya’s	 interests	 to	 remain	 a	 part	 of	 the	
Sterling	Area	and	to	link	this	with	Britain’s	political	and	economic	situation	at	the	time.	
	 Both	Strange	and	Schenk	provide	accounts	of	 the	establishment	of	 the	Malayan	Central	
Bank	 in	 1959,	 which	 was	 discussed	 at	 the	 negotiations	 over	 independence.9	Where	 Strange	
argues	 that	 Britain	 was	 resistant	 to	 its	 establishment	 due	 to	 a	 desire	 to	 have	 Malaya	 still	




enticing	 location	 for	 foreign	 investment.	 While	 both	 accounts	 are	 very	 interesting,	 Strange’s	
account	 provides	 no	 primary	 sources	 to	 support	 her	 conclusions,	 and	 Schenk’s	 account	 fails	 to	
provide	 a	 critical	 explanation	 behind	 the	 logic	 for	Malaya’s	 reticence	 to	 enthusiastically	 pursue	
monetary	independence.	For	example,	there	is	no	reflection	upon	the	fact	that	both	Malaya	and	
Britain	 see	 continuity	within	 the	 Sterling	Area	 as	 a	means	 for	 economic	 stability	–	 it	 is	merely	
presented	 as	 the	 reason	 for	 Malayan	 reluctance	 to	 pursue	 monetary	 independence 10	
Furthermore,	this	paper,	while	certainly	concerned	with	economic	and	monetary	issues,	does	not	
intend	to	focus	at	great	depth	on	the	establishment	of	the	Malayan	Central	Bank,	its	origins	in	the	
International	 Bank	mission	 to	Malaya	 in	 1954,	 or	 the	 specific	 nature	 of	 the	 negotiations	 in	 its	
setup.	
The	goal	of	this	paper	is	not	to	dismiss	the	literature	but	rather	to	emphasize	aspects	of	it	




hence	 miss	 the	 specifics	 of	 each	 relationship12,	 or	 focus	 on	 the	 specifics	 of	 British-Malayan	
relations	 but	 do	 not	 interrogate	 the	 nature	 of	 that	 relationship.13	As	 such,	 this	paper	 does	 not	
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reject	the	literature	but	seeks	to	fill	a	gap	in	understanding	the	relationship	between	Britain	and	

















	 The	 Treasury	 responded	 to	 the	 request	 by	 pointing	 out	 that	 the	 UK	 abided	 by	 rules	
common	 to	 the	 entire	 Sterling	 Area	 –	dollar	 expenditure	was	 acceptable	 as	 long	 as	 it	 was	 for	
essential	 purchases.	 Synthetic	 rubber	 imports	 were	 considered	 essential	 purchases	 as	 the	
efficiency	 and	 competitiveness	 of	 the	 UK	 rubber	 manufacturing	 industry	 relied	 on	 them.	 The	
Treasury	maintained	that	the	import	programme	in	1956	was	not	excessive	and	therefore	was	a	
justifiable	use	of	dollars.	The	Treasury	also	refused	to	review	the	programme.16	
	 The	Colonial	Office	 sent	 a	 letter	 to	Donald	MacGillivray,	 the	High	Commissioner	 of	 the	
Federation	of	Malaya,	a	few	days	after	 the	 initial	Treasury	response	to	reiterate	the	reasons	for	
the	 synthetic	 rubber	 imports,	 and	 the	 stubbornness	 about	 maintaining	 them.	 In	 the	 letter,	
Lennox-Boyd,	 the	 Colonial	 Secretary,	 emphasised	 that	 this	 policy	was	 entirely	 consonant	with	







	 Average	 natural	 rubber	 prices	 in	 1955	 had	 reached	 a	 post-Korean	 war	 high	 of	 around	
34p/lb.,	which	 had	 stimulated	 the	 competitiveness	of	 synthetic	 rubber	 production.18	The	use	 of	
synthetic	 rubber	 was	 also	 preferred	 for	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 rubber	 manufacturing	 end	 uses	 and	
Lennox-Boyd	argued	that	the	import	of	synthetic	rubber	in	this	instance	would	greatly	reduce	the	






clear	 that	 import	 controls	 on	 essential	 dollar	 imports	 were	 contrary	 to	 the	 Sterling	 Area’s	
economic	policy	and	also	asserted	that	GATT	obligations	required	that	Britain	should	not	employ	
quantitative	 import	 restrictions	 for	 protective	 purposes,	 despite	 using	 exactly	 the	 opposite	
argument	in	the	mid-1940s	to	justify	quantitative	import	restrictions.20	The	Colonial	Office’s	final	
point	was	 to	say	 that	 imports	of	Malayan	 rubber	 into	Britain	were	of	 such	a	 small	amount	 that	
swapping	synthetic	 imports	for	Malayan	 imports	would	have	 little	effect	 indeed.	Natural	rubber	
was	 principally	 consumed	 in	 the	 US	 market,	 where	 natural	 and	 synthetic	 rubber	 was	 in	 free	
competition.21		
	 The	arguments	put	forward	by	both	the	Colonial	Office	and	the	Treasury	to	the	Federation,	
and	 subsequently	 reiterated	 by	 the	 High	 Commissioner	 in	 Malaya,	 settled	 the	 matter	 on	 the	
specific	 issue	 of	 synthetic	 rubber	 imports.	 However,	 the	 concern	 over	 the	 issue	 was	 merely	 a	











• Full	 membership	 of	 the	 Sterling	 Area,	 so	 that	 Malaya	 will	 be	 consulted	 on	 matters	 of	
common	policy	and	will	be	invited	to	attend	Finance	Ministers’	meetings;	
• Britain	was	 to	 accept	 that	Malaya’s	 capital	 requirements	were	 to	be	met	 in	 the	London	
market,	to	the	tune	of	£20m	over	the	next	five	years;	
• Malaya	was	to	have	freedom	to	import	from	dollar	sources,	and	to	have	free	access	to	its	
own	 dollar	 surplus	 in	 order	 to	 develop	 its	 economy	 to	 expand	 trade	with	 neighbouring	
countries;	





and	 an	 immediate	 issue	 for	 the	 Talks,	 and	 saw	 the	 Bank	 provide	 an	 insight	 into	 divisions	 on	
Sterling	Area	policy	within	the	state	management.	





Sterling	Area.	 If	 this	were	 permitted,	 it	would	 be	 difficult	 to	 deny	 similar	 concessions	 to	 other	
countries	 (e.g.	 the	 colonies	 of	 the	 former	 British	West	 Africa)	 and	 therefore,	 according	 to	 the	
memo,	the	Colonial	Office	too	would	have	to	abandon	its	current	efforts	to	keep	all	Colonies	on	
the	 same	 exchange	 policy.25 	The	 Bank	 then	 was	 much	 more	 committed	 to	 the	 Collective	
Approach	than	the	Colonial	Office	or	the	Treasury,	who	were	still	committed	to	the	maintenance	
of	exchange	controls	around	the	Sterling	Area.	However,	by	this	point,	 the	Collective	Approach	





special	 status	 was	 brought	 up	 by	 the	Malayan	 delegation,	 since	 Hong	 Kong	 had	much	 greater	
dollar	freedom	than	any	country	in	the	Sterling	Area.27	However,	this	was	because	Hong	Kong	was	
an	entrepot	area	for	China,	Korea,	Macao,	and	Taiwan	and	sold	large	quantities	of	goods	to	these	
territories	and	 in	 return	 received	 large	quantities	of	dollars,	which	Hong	Kong	was	permitted	 to	
use	freely.28	Hong	Kong’s	dollar	earnings	actually	provided	a	net	contribution	to	the	Sterling	Area,	
while	Sterling	accounts	 in	 the	 colony	were	 restricted	and	 the	Hong	Kong	government	enforced	






Kong	are	 in	effect	a	compromise	between	 its	 two	roles	as	an	outlet	 for	China	
and	neighbouring	countries	and	as	a	Sterling	Area	 territory;	 they	can	only	be	
justified	 because	 of	 the	 exceptional	 circumstances,	 which	 are	 of	 over-riding	
importance	to	the	economic	existence	of	the	territory	concerned.”30		
	 It	 was	 then	 put	 to	 the	 Malayan	 delegation	 that	 there	 was	 no	 justifiable	 comparison	
between	 the	Malayan	and	Hong	Kong	economies,	which	 they	were	 satisfied	with.31	John	Fisher,	
Deputy	 Chief	 Cashier	 at	 the	 Bank,	made	 one	 further	 point	 that	 the	most	 basic	 and	 convincing	
argument	against	a	Malayan	free	market	was	Malayan	development.32	Malaya	required	stability	in	
order	 to	develop	and,	 as	 such,	 fluctuating	exchange	 rates	would	 run	 contrary	 to	 this	 since	 they	
would	 require	 a	 barrier	 between	Malaya	 and	 the	 Sterling	Area	 instead	 of	 the	 current	 statutory	
arrangement.33		
	 Given	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 comparison	 between	Malaya	 and	Hong	Kong,	 a	member	 of	 the	
Malayan	delegation	approached	the	Chief	General	Manager	of	Chartered	Bank,	Howard	Morford,	
to	tell	him	that	the	Malayan	delegation	was	now	considering	setting	up	Singapore	as	a	free	market	




	 The	purpose	behind	 this	determination	 to	achieve	 free	use	of	dollars	was,	of	course,	 for	
Malaya	 to	 expand	 its	 primary	 and	 secondary	 industries	 and	 a	 free	 market	 was	 seen	 by	 the	




exchange	 barriers	 would	 be	 required,	 it	 would	 strain	 the	 link	 between	 currencies,	 and	 it	 was	
entirely	 dissonant	 with	 Malaya’s	 professed	 intention	 of	 staying	 in	 the	 Sterling	 Area	 and	
committing	to	the	obligations	inherent	to	that.36	
	 By	the	end	of	the	Constitutional	Talks	in	mid-February	1956,	a	provisional	agreement	had	
been	 reached	 about	 the	 lead-up	 to	 the	 Federation’s	 independence.	 The	 Talks	 had	 led	 to	 an	
agreement	that	an	elected	Malayan	Finance	Minister	would	take	over	all	responsibility	for	internal	





given	 to	 Malaya	 that	 “sympathetic	 consideration”	 would	 be	 given	 to	 Federation	 borrowing	 in	
London	 for	 development	 purposes.38	Furthermore,	 Britain	 pledged	 to	 give	 fair	 treatment	 to	




Area.	 The	 Malayan	 Delegation	 indicated	 that	 it	 was	 the	 view	 of	 their	
Government	 that	 membership	 of	 the	 Sterling	 Area	 was	 to	 the	 common	
advantage	 of	 the	 Federation	 and	 the	 other	 members	 and	 that	 it	 was	 their	
intention	to	remain	in	it	after	attaining	full	self-government.	There	was	general	
recognition	 by	 the	United	Kingdom	 representatives	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 the	
Federation's	contribution	to	the	strength	of	the	Sterling	Area	through	the	direct	
earnings	of	dollars	from	rubber	and	tin.”40		





“We	 cannot	 regard	 Colonial	 economies	 as	 ‘entirely	 external’	 to	 that	 of	 the	
United	 Kingdom.	 Such	 description	 would,	 indeed,	 have	 little	 meaning.	 For	









great	 a	 strain	on	 the	 reserves,	 they	would	dwindle	 to	nothing	 in	 the	process,	 and	 the	Colonies	
would	 suffer	 as	much	 from	 that	as	Britain.43	Britain’s	dollar	 reserves	 in	February	 1956	were	 still	
very	low	at	£77m,	with	gold	reserves	at	their	lowest	level	since	June	1953	at	£703m.44		




interests	 in	both	 the	Federation	 in	Singapore	 in	 rubber	estates	and	 tin	mines.45	Lee,	 like	British	
officials,	did	not	want	to	see	Singapore	become	a	free	dollar	market.	Lee	became	the	key	figure	in	











the	 Federation	 government	 sought	 to	 have	 the	 corporation	 based	 on	 majority	 private	
investment.47		The	 Federation	was	 also	 using	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 Central	 Bank	 as	 a	




Development	 Corporation,	 they	 informed	 the	 Bank	 that	 this	 was	 usual	 for	 colonies	 heading	
towards	 independence	 and	 there	 were	 precedents	 for	 it.	 However,	 they	 acknowledged	 that,	
ordinarily,	 the	Colonial	Development	and	Food	Corporation	(CDFC)	would	provide	funds	for	the	
corporation	but	the	Malayan	government	had	not	approached	the	CDFC	for	funds.49	Colonel	Lee	
also	 contacted	 the	 British	 government	 at	 this	 point	 to	 ask	 for	 financial	 aid	 for	 Malayan	
development;	however,	the	Colonial	Office	was	reticent	to	approve	any	funds	unless	the	details	of	
a	 specific	 development	 plan	 were	 provided	 but	 these	 had	 not	 yet	 been	 drawn	 up	 by	 the	
Federation.50		
	 Certainly,	the	Federation	was	very	eager	to	gain	access	to	large	amounts	of	ready	cash	to	
spend	 on	 development	 in	 the	 run	 up	 to	 independence.51	Indeed,	 by	 the	 end	 of	 June,	 Donald	
MacGillivray	telegrammed	Alan	Lennox-Boyd	to	 inform	him	that	 the	Federation	had	asked	him	
about	lifting	the	rubber	embargo	against	China.52	The	High	Commissioner	had	informed	Colonel	
Lee	 that	 the	 British	 government	would	 require	 an	 end-use	 certificate	 due	 to	 security	 concerns	
about	 its	application;	however,	this	would	probably	be	meaningless	and	therefore	he	suggested	
using	a	quantitative	restriction	instead	and	proposed	an	initial	limit	of	2000	tons	of	rubber.53	The	
embargo	on	 rubber	exports	 to	China	was	ultimately	 relaxed.	 It	was	 too	difficult	 to	get	end-use	
agreements	 from	 the	 Chinese	 government	 but	Malayan	 exports	 assured	 Sir	 Robert	 Black	 that	
their	 rubber	exports	were	used	only	 for	civilian	purposes.	These	shipments	constituted	 the	 first	
rubber	exports	to	China	from	Malaya	since	1951.54		
	 By	 August,	 however,	 Britain	 was	 forced	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 repercussions	 of	 the	
nationalization	of	the	Suez	Canal,	an	action	described	in	the	Bank	as	imperilling	“the	survival	of	
the	UK	and	the	Commonwealth,	and	represents	a	very	great	danger	to	Sterling”.55	A	letter	to	the	
Governor	 of	 the	 Bank	 highlighted	 that	 the	 use	 of	 economic	 warfare	 against	 Egypt	 would	 be	
detrimental	to	Britain,	especially	to	the	reserves.56	This	was	not	catastrophic	at	the	time,	as	the	
 11 
reserves	 had	 reached	 a	 comparative	 highpoint	 with	 dollar	 reserves	 at	 £137m	 and	 with	 gold	
reserves	at	£722m.57	However,	 the	Suez	 crisis,	 due	 to	both	economic	warfare	and	 the	effect	on	
Sterling,	diminished	the	reserves	significantly.	By	the	end	of	August	dollar	reserves	had	fallen	to	
£88m,	and	by	the	end	of	November	had	fallen	again	to	£47m,	with	gold	reserves	at	£655m.58	






abated	with	Britain’s	 unconditional	withdrawal	 from	 the	 Suez	Canal	 Zone,	with	 dollar	 reserves	
rallying	up	to	£166m	by	the	end	of	the	year.60	
	 Against	 this	 backdrop,	 Financial	 Talks	 between	 Britain	 and	 the	 Federation	 were	 being	
prepared,	 starting	on	December	 17th	1956.	The	Federation	had	begun	 to	worry	 about	 revenues	
after	 independence,	 as	 the	 IBRD’s	 report	 on	 Malaya’s	 economic	 development	 suggested	 that	
rubber	prices	would	 fall	 between	1957	and	1960.61	The	Federation	 then	 sought	 further	 financial	
assistance	 from	the	British	government	but	 the	Colonial	Office	was	 reticent	 to	accede	to,	what	
they	termed,	Malaya’s	“exorbitant	demands”,	considering	them	extremely	unreasonable.62		
	 In	communication	with	 the	Colonial	Secretary,	 the	Commissioner-General	of	South	East	
Asia,	Sir	Robert	Scott,	 reiterated	 the	High	Commissioner’s	 plea	 that	 the	Colonial	Office	 accept	
Malaya’s	 request	 for	 generous	 aid.	 He	 emphasized	 that	 the	 financial	 situation	 in	 Britain	would	
certainly	 be	 better	 suited	 to	 the	 economic	 arguments	 for	 doing	 so	 but	 these	 arguments	
supported	 broader	 political	 ones.63	While	 there	were	 substantial	 British	 investments	 in	Malaya,	
running	 to	 hundreds	 of	millions	 of	 pounds,	 plus	 the	 invisible	 earnings	 accruing	 from	 shipping,	
banking	 and	 insurance,	 this	 was	 not	 the	 best	 argument	 for	 being	 generous	 with	 Malayan	
development	aid.64	
“The	main	economic	argument	for	financial	aid	is,	quite	simply,	dollars.	On	the	
prosperity	 of	Malaya	 and	on	 the	 stability	 of	 its	 economy	depends	 one	 of	 the	
biggest	single	sources	of	American	dollars	at	the	disposal	of	the	Sterling	bloc,	if	
not	 indeed	 the	 biggest	 individual	 source.	 Malaya	 earns	 some	 hundreds	 of	
millions	of	dollars	a	year,	a	quarter	or	more	of	the	total	dollars	accruing	to	the	
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whole	 sterling	 area.	 Surely	 the	 greater	 the	 strain	 on	 sterling,	 the	 greater	 the	
need	to	conserve	such	a	vital	source	of	dollars.	 If	that	can	be	done	by	sterling	
expenditure,	it	is	cheap	at	almost	any	price.”65	
	 Essential	 to	 Malaya’s	 source	 of	 dollars	 was	 the	 rubber	 industry	 and	 Abdul	 Rahman	
contacted	the	Colonial	Secretary	the	day	after	Sir	Robert	Scott’s	letter	to	assure	him	that	rubber	
replantation	was	the	highest	priority	in	the	Federation’s	development	plan.66		




come	 up	 again	 since	 the	 issue	 had	 been	 extensively	 covered	 in	 the	 Constitutional	 Talks	 at	 the	






starkly	by	 saying	 that	 the	British	government	did	not	and	 could	not	give	direct	 financial	 aid	 to	
independent	members	of	the	Commonwealth	for	development	since	it	was	considered	“a	normal	
economic	activity	in	which	any	independent	Government	must	stands	on	its	own	feet”	and	there	
was	 a	 stated	 suspicion	 among	 the	 British	 delegation	 that,	 if	 the	 costs	 were	 spread	 out,	 the	
Federation	 could	 meet	 them.71	The	 Malayan	 delegation,	 which	 included	 Abdul	 Rahman	 and	
Colonel	Lee,	were	extremely	disappointed	with	this	response	from	the	British.	
	 However,	 as	 had	 been	 agreed	 in	 the	 Constitutional	 Talks	 in	 early	 1956,	 Britain	 would	
provide	 financial	aid	 to	meet	 the	costs	of	 the	Malayan	Emergency.	This	was	not	only	 seen	as	a	
contribution	 to	 the	 Emergency	 but	 also	 to	 the	 Federation’s	 development	 plan	 as	 it	 freed	 up	
significant	 resources,	with	 the	development	of	Malaya	 “recognized	 to	be	 in	 itself	 an	 important	
contribution	to	the	fight	against	communism”.72	Britain	agreed	to	provide	an	annual	grant	of	£3m	












seek	 local	 development	 loans	worth	 around	M$10m	per	 year	 through	 the	Malayan	Post	Office	
Savings	Bank	(POSB),	the	Bank	of	England	were	extremely	reticent	to	support	this	notion.77	There	
would	 be	 a	 great	 risk	 of	 capital	 loss	 to	 the	 POSB,	 since	 there	 was	 no	 limit	 on	 the	 amount	 of	
government	 stock	 the	POSB	could	purchase,	 the	POSB’s	portfolio	would	be	extremely	 limited,	
and	“in	an	economy	as	dependent	as	the	Federation	on	the	vicissitudes	of	the	world	markets	for	
tin	 and	 natural	 rubber,	 the	 interests	 of	 depositors	 must	 surely	 be	 carefully	 watched	 and	 not	
sacrificed	for	development	expedience”.78	So	while	British	officials	were	eager	for	Malaya	to	have	




economy,	 including	 the	 prolonging	 of	 oil	 supply	 difficulties;	 however,	 both	 Leslie	 Rowan	 and	
Denis	Rickett	were	sanguine,	in	a	letter	to	Cameron	Cobbold,	about	the	position	of	Sterling	due	to	
the	 resolution	 of	 domestic	 political	 instability	 through	 Eden’s	 resignation	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	
1957,	 and	 the	 boost	 likely	 to	 be	 given	 to	 Sterling	 through	 the	 seasonal	 effect	 on	Sterling	Area	
commodities.79	
	 Bound	 up	 tightly	 with	 the	 issue	 of	 Malayan	 independence,	 and	 the	 value	 of	 Malaya’s	
Sterling	Area	membership,	was	the	issue	of	economic	development.	In	order	for	Malaya	to	remain	
a	 persistent	 and	 consistent	 dollar	 earner,	 the	 British	 state	 had	 to,	 in	 some	 form,	 invest	 in	 the	
Malayan	economy.	This	was	a	point	acknowledged	and	agreed	by	both	Malayan	and	British	state	






was	 arranged	 for	 the	 BBC	 to	 discuss	 Malaya’s	 independence	 from	 the	 British	 Empire	 and	 the	
Treasury	was	asked	to	provide	some	answers	for	the	questions	that	would	be	asked.	Most	of	the	
questions	 focused	 on	 Malaya’s	 membership	 of	 the	 Sterling	 Area,	 and	 the	 Treasury,	 Bank	 and	







instead	of	 in	dollars	enables	her	 to	obtain	 the	advantages	of	Sterling	Area	membership”.82	This	
became	 a	 particularly	 pointed	 issue	 with	Malaya	 seeking	 its	 own	 dollar	 reserves,	 independent	
from	the	Sterling	Area’s	general	pool,	following	independence.83	
Over	a	month	after	Malayan	 independence,	Britain’s	 reserve	position	was	still	extremely	
precarious,	 leading	 the	Chancellor,	Peter	Thorneycroft,	 to	make	 the	 following	statement	 to	 the	
Cabinet:	
“We	 have	 been	 near	 to	 the	 edge	 of	 economic	 disaster.	We	 are	 still	 near	 the	
edge.	Over	the	past	two	months	we	have	lost	£185	millions	from	our	gold	and	









	 Following	 independence,	 the	 Colonial	 Secretary	 submitted	 to	 Parliament	 his	 Annual	









of	 surrendered	 since	 the	 Emergency	 was	 declared	 in	 1948;	 and	 security	 forces	 had	 suffered	
around	9,000	killed,	wounded	and	missing	in	the	same	time.86	
	 With	independence,	the	insurgency	in	Malaya	lost	its	principal	justification	and	resistance	
to	 Commonwealth	 and	 Malayan	 troops	 dwindled	 swiftly,	 though	 the	 Emergency	 itself	 lasted	
formally	until	 1960.	However,	while	 independence	heralded	 the	 formal	exit	of	Malaya	 from	the	
British	Empire,	 the	 relationship	between	Britain	and	Malaya	 remained	 fundamentally	 the	 same	
through	 the	 institution	 of	 the	 Sterling	 Area.	 Indeed,	 as	 the	 Movement	 for	 Colonial	 Freedom	
argued	at	the	time,	“But	although	politically	free,	Malaya	has	yet	far	to	go	before	she	can	truly	call	
herself	 ‘independent’.	For	even	 in	the	 instrument	of	 independence	—	the	London	Agreement	—	
the	economic	and	military	interests	of	Britain	still	bind	Malaya.”87	
Conclusion	
The	paper	has	 argued	 that	 the	 fundamental	 relationship	between	Britain	 and	Malaya	does	not	
substantially	 change	 following	 formal	 independence,	 as	 the	 relationship	 is	 still	 ultimately	
governed	 by	 the	 logic	 and	 nature	 of	 the	 Sterling	 Area	 mechanism	 as	 a	 means	 of	 managing	
Malayan	 economic	 and	 monetary	 policy	 to	 benefit	 Britain.	 Malaya	 remains	 important	 to	 the	
Sterling	Area	throughout	this	period,	a	 fact	cited	by	officials	 in	the	Bank,	Treasury	and	Colonial	
Office,	due	to	its	large	dollar	earning	capacity	and	the	continued	inability	of	the	Sterling	Area	and	
Britain	 to	 balance	 trade	 with	 the	 dollar	 area,	 which	 is	 revealed	 by	 state	 managers	 and	 also	
through	the	meagre	size	of	Britain’s	(and	the	Sterling	Area’s)	convertible	currency	reserves.	
Even	 after	 independence,	 when	 the	 formal	 vestiges	 of	 empire	were	 removed,	Malaya’s	
relationship	with	Britain	 is	still	managed	by	these	same	factors,	and	they	continue	to	dominate	
the	 relationship.	 Britain	 identified	 in	Malaya	 a	 prime	 support	 for	 the	 Sterling	 Area,	 which	was	
itself	 a	 key	 component	 for	 the	 maintenance	 of	 Sterling	 as	 an	 international	 currency	 and	 for	
Britain’s	 economic	 vitality.	 While	 this	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 Malaya	 was	 essential	 to	 the	 British	
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economy,	 or	 to	 the	 stability	 of	 Sterling,	 it	 certainly	 played	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 strategy	 for	
maintaining	 the	Sterling	Area,	which	 still	 remained	 a	 vital	 component	 of	Britain’s	 international	
economic	 policy.	Without	Malaya,	more	 stringent	 import	 restrictions	 on	 dollar	 area	 goods	 and	
further	emergency	measures,	which	would	have	required	a	significant	change	in	the	quality	of	life	
for	citizens	of	Sterling	Area	countries,	would	have	been	necessary	and	they	would	have	seriously	
retarded	Britain’s	economic	 recovery,	as	well	as	 the	 recovery	of	global	 trade	which	was	vital	 to	
Britain’s	economy.	Indeed,	it	is	worth	noting	that,	in	1957,	Britain	retained	an	annual	trade	deficit	





this	period	concerning	Malaya’s	 role	and	membership	 in	 the	Sterling	Area	are	convincing.	They	













extract	 itself	 from	the	 imperial	 relationship	since	 its	economy	depended	upon	the	continuity	of	
this	relationship.	
This	period	particularly	has	been	seen	in	terms	of	discontinuity.90	However,	looking	at	the	
content	 of	 the	 documents	 in	 both	 Bank	 and	 National	 Archives,	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 relationship	
between	 Britain	 and	Malaya	we	 see	 a	 very	 strong	 continuity.	 The	 same	 reasons	 prevail	 in	 this	








the	 shift	 from	 formal	 to	 informal	 empire,	 instead	 focusing	 on	 the	 “underlying	 constraints”	
surrounding	the	Malayan	economy	at	the	time.93	However,	the	“economic	dependence”	Schenk	
refers	 to	 is	 still,	 at	heart,	 the	 core	of	 a	historically	developed	and	unequal	 imperial	 relationship	
between	Britain	and	Malaya.	This	is	not	to	dismiss	Schenk’s	work.	On	the	contrary,	her	analysis	of	
the	 policy	 alternatives	 for	 both	 Britain	 and	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 Sterling	 Area	 clearly	 identifies	 the	
political	 economic	 conditions	 within	 which	 Britain	 manages	 the	 Sterling	 Area,	 and	 why	 the	
Sterling	 Area	 route	 was	 taken.94	However,	 this	 also	 avoids	 framing	 the	 Sterling	 Area	 as	 an	
instrument	of	imperial	rule.	White,	too,	while	acknowledging	the	importance	of	Malaya	as	a	dollar	
earner	 within	 the	 Sterling	 Area	 beyond	 the	 1950s,	 focuses	 instead	 on	 the	 erratic	 and	
discontinuous	 relationship	 between	 business	 and	 government,	 concluding	 that	 business	 never	
meaningfully	influenced	government,	and	thus	rejecting	the	‘gentlemanly	capitalism’	thesis.95	It	is	
that	 importance	 to	 the	 Sterling	 Area,	 and	 the	 desire	 for	 British	 state	 managers	 to	 persuade	
Malayan	state	managers	of	that	importance,	that	this	article	has	sought	to	expand	upon.		
One	 final	 conclusion	 of	 this	 paper	 is	 the	 continued	 value	 of	 looking	 not	 only	 at	 specific	
relationships	within	the	British	Empire,	but	also	considering	these	in	terms	of	the	broader	political	
economy	of	the	time.	The	continued	value	of	Economic	History	to	any	study	of	imperial	relations	
is	 well	 known,	 and	 has	 been	 exhorted	 by	 a	 recent	 special	 issue	 of	 the	 Journal	 of	 Imperial	 and	
Commonwealth	 History;	 however,	 it	 is	 also	 important	 to	 emphasise	 the	 Janus-like	 nature	 of	
politics	and	economics,	and	that	one	cannot	be	fully	understood	without	the	other.96	
                                                
1 	Colonial	 constitutional	 changes:	 policy	 and	 progress	 1956-1957,	 October	 1957,	 Colonial	 Office	
Memoranda	 on	 Colonial	 Affairs	 1951-1960,	 MSS.292/930.6/1,	 Trades	 Union	 Congress	 Archive,	 Modern	
Records	Centre,	University	of	Warwick	(MRC)	
2	Ibid.;	Galsworthy	to	Monson,	3rd	December	1956,	CO1030/903,	TNA	















considers	 the	 relationship	British	and	Malayan	governments	have	with	business	 interests;	Harper	 (2001)	
focuses	 on	 a	 variety	 of	 issues	 including	 communal	 politics	 in	 Malaya	 but	 always	 from	 a	 Malayan	
perspective.	
14	See,	inter	alia,	White	(1996;	1997;	2000;	2003);	Stockwell	(1984;	1998);	Schenk	(1993;	1994;	1996;	2008);	
Lim	 (1967);	 Krozewski	 (1997;	 1996;	 1993;	 2001);	 Jomo	 (1988);	 Holland	 ((1984;	 1985);	 Hinds	 (1987;	 1999;	








21	Ibid.	 This	 seemed	 a	 peculiar	 thing	 to	 say	 since	 the	 Colonial	 Office’s	 stated	 figure	 of	 70,000	 tons	
accounted	for	around	11%	of	Malaya’s	entire	rubber	crop	in	1956	(calculated	from	Barlow	1978,	Appendix	
3.1).	The	figure	then,	while	not	representing	an	amount	that	would	have	a	massive	impact	on	the	price	of	




















32	The	 issue	 of	Malayan	 development	 has	 also	 been	 the	 subject	 of	 some	 debate.	 Principally,	 this	 exists	
between	Bauer	(1957;	1973)	and	Rudner	(1972;	1973;	1976).	Where	Rudner	argues	that	British	involvement	
in	Malayan	post-war	development	was	 ‘hands	off’,	Bauer	offers	a	more	nuanced	understanding,	arguing	
that	 Britain’s	 involvement	 was	 sporadic	 but	 ultimately	 unsuccessful.	 In	 more	 recent	 literature,	 White	



























would	 not	 agree.	 Alternatively,	 if	 Britain	 did	 permit	 the	 trade,	 there	 might	 be	 complaints	 from	 the	









officials	 were	 unsure	 of	 how	 successful	 the	 Chancellor’s	 statement	 on	 4th	 December	 1956	 would	 in	
boosting	confidence	of	Sterling,	the	reserves	did	see	a	boost.	The	Bank	decided	to	hold	Sterling	rates	at	
their	current	levels	but	in	the	event	of	a	speculative	attack,	they	were	told	take	no	action	in	preventing	a	








points	 out	 that	 British	 military	 strength	 east	 of	 Suez	 relied	 on	 bases	 in	 Malaya.	 The	 Anglo-Malayan	










































92	A	 similar	 conclusion	 is	 reached	 by	 Attard	 (2013)	 and	 Attard	 &	 Dilley	 (2013,	 4),	 who	 emphasize	 the	
“ongoing	 interests”	of	British	capital	as	the	basis	for	continuity	 in	Queensland	colony	 in	the	1860s.	Their	
work	also	underscores	the	continued	value	of	understanding	the	nuanced	character	of	historical	political	
economy	in	conceiving	imperial	relations	(ibid.,	2).	This	is	a	point	also	made	by	Burnham	(2006)	in	slightly	
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